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Abstract The technology that has evolved with innovations in the digital world has also
caused an increase in many security problems. Day by day, the methods and
forms of cyberattacks are becoming more complicated; therefore, their detection
has become more difficult. In this work, we have used datasets that have been
prepared in collaboration with the Raymond Borges and Oak Ridge National
Laboratories. These datasets include measurements of the Industrial Control
Systems related to chewing attack behavior. These measurements include syn-
chronized measurements and data records from Snort and relays with a simu-
lated control panel. In this study, we developed two models using these datasets.
The first is a model we call the DNN model, which was build using the lat-
est deep learning algorithms. The second model was created by adding the
AutoEncoder structure to the DNN model. All of the variables used when de-
veloping our models were set parametrically. A number of variables such as
the activation method, the number of hidden layers in the model, the number
of nodes in the layers, and the number of iterations were analyzed to create
the optimum model design. When we run our model with optimum settings,
we obtained better results than those found in related studies. The learning
speed of the model has a 100% accuracy rate, which is also entirely satisfactory.
While the training period of the dataset containing about 4 thousand differ-
ent operations lasts for about 90 seconds, the developed model completes the
learning process at a level of milliseconds to detect new attacks. This increases
the applicability of the model in the real-world environment.
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1. Introduction
Nowadays, rapidly developing technology has replaced human power in many places.
Especially in large industrial systems such as critical infrastructures that cannot be
managed by human power, security problems could occur in their computer systems.
Their computer systems were installed many years ago and are vulnerable to almost
every current attack.
While the definition of critical infrastructure systems varies from country to coun-
try, it is generally defined as systems or entities that are necessary for the maintenance
of vital social processes, security, and economic security [8].
Critical infrastructures can generally be classified as agriculture and food, wa-
ter, public health and safety, emergency services, government, defense industry base,
information and telecommunication, energy, transportation, banking and finance, in-
dustry and manufacturing, and mail and shipping. Each of these sectors has critical
infrastructures, and interruptions of transactions or damage to these infrastructures
may be a vital element in people’s living standards that can have a life-saving impact
and can even threaten human life. However, since they have large infrastructural
investments, they can cause serious economic losses and weakness of states.
Critical infrastructures are not isolated systems. Anyone of these infrastructures
that interact with each other will cause damage to the chain. For all of these reasons,
the protection of these systems is vital [4]. The STUXNET attack (one example of
an attack on critical infrastructure) has demonstrated this effect. This attack, which
caused Iran to take its nuclear development activity back two years, caused only
economic losses. However, it also revealed the possibility of the nuclear plant being
damaged in the worse-case scenario, which could lead to a disaster in that area [5].
Day by day, the methods and forms of cyberattacks are becoming more complicated;
therefore, their detection has become more difficult. According to a 2018 report by
FireEye, a cyberattack’s detection time is 101 days globally, 175 days for the EMEA
region, and 498 days for the APAC region.
The purpose of this study is to reduce and automate the perception of increasing
the dwell time of cyber threats by using deep learning algorithms.
1.1. Contribution
• We worked with an up-to-date dataset created in 2014 by Mississippi State Uni-
versity and Oak Ridge National Laboratory. The dataset is a reliable dataset
used in many scientific research projects [10,12].
• We used the latest in-depth learning algorithms and technologies: AutoEncoder
model, Tensorflow 1.4.0, Keras 2.1.1, Sklearn 0.19.1, Scipy 1.0.0, Numpy 1.13.3,
and Pandas 0.21.0.
• We obtained better results than the classification performance obtained in the
related studies that we examined.
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2. Related work
Various studies are used in this critical infrastructure dataset. Detailed explanations
of the papers listed above are given in the coming subsections.
2.1. Developing hybrid intrusion detection system
using data mining for power systems
An IDS (Intrusion Detection System) is a system that automates cyberattack de-
tection. Many cyberattacks have similar characteristics. A signature is extracted
from these properties; these signatures for similar cyberattacks simplify the work of
IDS systems. In this study, feature-based systems are used along with signature-based
systems. Normal system interruptions such as maintenance, normal operation, and
cyberattack situations are taught to the IDS, and the IDS system’s capabilities are
developed for a possible cyberattack; these are aimed at detecting previously un-
seen cyberattacks such as zero-day clearance. The accuracy rate of these systems is
90.4%; an operation with an accuracy rate of 90.4% means that nearly 10 attacks
cannot be detected per 100 attacks. When it is considered that this number is much
higher in living systems, it is expected that such automatic systems will work with
near-zero error.
2.2. Classification of disturbances and cyberattacks
in power systems using heterogeneous time-synchronized data
It is mentioned that [11] has three contributions in the literature. First, they point
out that cyberattacks (which show themselves as a normal system interruption) can
be recognized and discerned from system outages and achieve better results than the
work done with. Their approach uses less memory usage when compared to tradi-
tional machine learning algorithms. In this work, authors use the common path min-
ing algorithm, thus indicating that they use less memory than traditional data mining
methods. Third – it learns by separating the set of algorithm scenarios and the dataset
that they use. Here, a common path-finding algorithm is developed to prevent over-
-adaptation. The algorithm used in the study had better results than algorithms like
Random forest and JRip, and it performed more poorly than algorithm applications
like Adaboost + Jrip. The accuracy rate of the algorithm for the multi-class problem
is 93%. This rate is not suitable when considering the number of today’s attacks.
2.3. Specification-based intrusion detection framework
for cyber-physical environment in electric power system
In this article, a method has been proposed to detect scabby attacks on power sys-
tems or scans on physical breaks. This method reveals a specification-based intrusion
detection system by monitoring the records of many devices, including existing cyber
intrusion detection systems, simulated control panels, snort-, relay-, and network-
-monitoring software, and control room computers. Depending on the different con-
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trol data, causal relationships between cyberattacks and interruptions are established.
In this work, the probabilistic network for generating IDS rules provides a method for
mapping such data to a Bayesian network. The Bayesian network is known for its pow-
erful heuristic for modeling interdependencies between variables as well as its ability
to graphically show causal relationships from data and workflow records [6]. Based on
a specific control scheme, this work illustrates the process of building such a Bayesian
network and deriving different system scenarios. With the proposed method, the IDS
tracks the transmission line; if there is any interruption in the power grid, the operator
may be informed that it is caused by a system problem or cyberattack. The accuracy
of the method used in the study is not explained with numeric results; however, it
seems that the method is more effective against physical effects. It has been stated
that the development of the IDS system based on the specification in the proposed
method may be expensive and require expertise. This is not the preferred case either.
2.4. Machine learning
for power system disturbance and cyberattack discrimination
In [2], a network specialist has developed a policy to decide whether an interruption
is due to a cyberattack or a natural event. It is difficult for a person to distinguish
between cyberattacks and natural phenomena because they have the same effect. For
this reason, an algorithm that can be used as a decision support tool to automate this
work has been studied. In this study, it was determined that the methods of teaching
a machine are sufficient to establish the relationship between the measurements in
the power system and the causes of interruption.
The classification performance of various machine learning methods are evalu-
ated, and the accuracy level of the proposed method is given. In the study, many
algorithms were used; the performances of these algorithms are classified.
When we analyzed the results of the study, the Adaboost + jRipper algorithm
showed the best accuracy rate (99.1%). In our study, it is obvious that we get better
results than the existing algorithms when we think that the ratio is 100% for binary-
and triple-class task and 99.8% for multi-class task.
3. Preliminaries
3.1. Datasets
In collaboration with Raymond Borges and Justin Beaver of Oak Ridge National
Laboratories, Adhikari et al. created three datasets that include measurements related
to an electric transmission system’s normal, control-maintenance, and cyberattack
behaviors. Measurements in the dataset include synchrophasor measurements and
data logs from Snort (a simulated control panel) and relays. The features information
in the dataset is detailed in Table 1. The design of the lab environment for the dataset
used in the study is shown in Figure 1.
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Table 1
Features in dataset
Features Description
PA1:VH – PA3:VH Phase A – C Voltage Phase Angle
PM1: V – PM3: V Phase A – C Voltage Phase Magnitude
PA4:IH – PA6:IH Phase A – C Current Phase Angle
PM4: I – PM6: I Phase A – C Current Phase Magnitude
PA7:VH – PA9:VH Pos. – Neg. – Zero Voltage Phase Angle
PM7: V – PM9: V Pos. – Neg. – Zero Voltage Phase Magnitude
PA10:VH – PA12:VH Pos. – Neg. – Zero Current Phase Angle
PM10: V – PM12: V Pos. – Neg. – Zero Current Phase Magnitude
F Frequency for relays
DF Frequency Delta (dF/dt) for relays
PA:Z Appearance Impedance for relays
PA:ZH Appearance Impedance Angle for relays
S Status Flag for relays
Figure 1. Dataset lab design
The datasets used in the study are classified according to their output labels. The
label distribution of the binary-class dataset is given in Table 2. The label distribution
of the triple-class dataset is given in Table 3. The label distribution of the multi-class
dataset is given in Table 4.
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Table 2
Event scenarios (Binary)
Scenario Description Number of rows
0 normal operation 1100
1 attack 3866
Table 3
Event scenarios (Triple)
Scenario Description Number of rows
−1 natural events 927
0 normal operation 173
1 attack 3866
Table 4
Event scenarios (Multi)
Scenario Description Rows
−2 fault from line (natural events) 264
−1 line maintenance (natural events) 663
0 regular operation (normal operation) 173
1 data injection – SLG fault replay (attack) 569
2 command injection against single relay to R1, R2, R3, R4
(attack)
346
3 command injection against single relay to R1 and R2 or R3 and
R4 (attack)
106
4 disabling relay function – single relay disabled & fault (attack) 1675
5 disabling relay function – two relays disabled & fault (attack) 898
6 disabling relay function – two relay disabled & line maintenance
(attack)
272
3.2. AutoEncoder
AutoEncoder is a type of Neural Network that first compresses multi-dimensional
data into a hidden area and then reconstructs the data from the compressed hidden
area. AutoEncoders have three type layers; input layer, hidden area, or hidden layer
and output layer. The number of nodes in the input layer is equal to the number of
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nodes in the output layer because AutoEncoder is meant to reconstruct the intended
data; this is called the input layer and hidden area encoder. The encoder allows one
to reduce multi-dimensional data to a smaller size. The decoder is called the decoder
between the hidden area and output layer. The decoder layer tries to reconfigure the
input instance by increasing the size of the compressed hidden layer [1,9]. The dataset
we use includes voltage measurements and consists of fractional numeric values that
will not affect the end result.
In our work, we used the AutoEncoder model to avoid being slowed down with
these fractional numeric values and avoiding false positives in the learning process.
The purpose of the AutoEncoder model is to increase the accuracy of the system by
deleting unnecessary detail. For example, the detail in a three-dimensional image
is unnecessary and must be reduced to two dimensions only for a shape-separating
operation. Another example is the most commonly used noise-reduction methods.
Noise-canceling images can be obtained when used with the AutoEncoder model [13].
An autoencoder always consists of two parts (the encoder and decoder) that can
be defined as transitions φ and ψ; the calculations of φ and ψ are given in the following
equations:
φ :X → F
ψ :F → X
(1)
where
argmin
φ,ψ
||X − (φoψ)X||2 (2)
In the simplest case where there is one hidden layer, the encoder stage of an
autoencoder takes input x ∈ Rd and maps it to z ∈ Rp. z is calculated from the
following equation:
z = σ(Wx + b) (3)
z is usually referred to as code, latent variable, or latent representation. Here, σ is
an element-wise activation function such as a sigmoid function or the rectified linear
unit. W is the weight matrix, and b is the bias vector. After that, the decoder stage
of the autoencoder maps z to reconstruction xˆ of the same shape as x
xˆ = σ(Wx + b) (4)
The AutoEncoder part that we added to our model is shown in Figure 2.
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Figure 2. Deep Neural Network model with AutoEncoder
3.3. Deep learning
A class of machine learning techniques where many layers of information-processing
stages in hierarchical architectures are exploited for unsupervised feature learning
and pattern analysis/classification. The essence of deep learning is to compute the
hierarchical features or representations of the observational data where the higher-
level features or factors [3]. The data set we use contains voltage information. It is
not possible for a person to interpret this data coming from 128 sensors and create an
attack pattern; however, Deep Neural Network approaches can easily do this, which
is impossible for people. For this reason, we used Deep Neural Network Algorithms
in our study, which have a very high ability to analyze nonlinear data.
3.4. Experimental results
Two separate models were designed in the study. The first is the DNN model, which
is a model in which the activation methods, hidden layer, and number of nodes are
changed dynamically. The second is the AutoEncoder model. In this model, the input
values of the DNN model are not directly read from the file. The inputs were first
passed through the AutoEncoder model and simplified, and these outputs were given
as DNN model inputs. The results of these two studies are separately analyzed and
presented below in detail.
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3.4.1. DNN model results
In the model, there are three designs called Layer Mode 1, Layer Mode 2, and Layer
Mode 3. The number of layers and nodes in these designs are given in Table 5.
Table 5
Nodes in layers
Layer Mode DNN model
1 129(input)-400-150-2/3/9(output)
2 129(input)-400-650-400-150-2/3/9(output)
3 129(input)-400-650-900-650-400-150-2/3/9(output)
There are too many parameters in the operation. To provide a more meaningful
representation of the outputs of the study, the results of the data classes called binary,
triple, multi are presented separately below.
3.4.2. Binary data class results
The model is run separately for 15 datasets in the binary data class with binary tags
with 0-Normal and 1-Attack. The Layer Mode 1 design results of the binary data
class are given in detail in Table 6.
Table 6
Binary data class results for Layer Mode 1
Epochs Accuracy Precision Recall F Score
tanh 200 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
softplus 200 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
softsign 200 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
linear 200 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
An analysis of the data in the Layer Mode 1 design shows that the four most suc-
cessful results are obtained with the ‘tanh’, ‘softplus’, ‘softsign’, and ‘linear’ activation
methods. The confusion matrix of these four methods is given in Table 7.
Table 7
Confusion matrix for Layer Mode 1 with test dataset
P N
P 303 0
N 0 711
tanh
P N
P 304 0
N 0 710
softplus
P N
P 310 0
N 0 704
softsign
P N
P 317 0
N 0 697
linear
When we run our model with the binary data class, we obtained a 100% accuracy
rate after nearly 30 epochs.
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We obtained this accuracy rate with the DNN model created with the following
parameter sequence:
• DNN Optimizer Algorithm : SGD,
• Nodes in the layers : 129(Input)-400-150-2(Output),
• Dropout Rate : 20%,
• Kernel Initializer : Uniform,
• Activation Method : Tanh,
• Epochs : 200,
• Output Activation Method : sigmoid,
• Output Loss Method : binary crossentropy.
With these parameters, the training duration of our model is 1:55 for 4055 differ-
ent processes. The test duration is approximately 280 milliseconds for 1014 different
processes, and the detection time of the new incoming attack is 0.28 milliseconds. The
Layer Mode 2 design results of the binary data class are given in detail in Table 8.
Table 8
Binary data class results for Layer Mode 2
Epochs Accuracy Precision Recall F Score
tanh 300 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
softsign 300 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
An analysis of the data in the Layer Mode 2 design shows that the two most
successful results are obtained with the ‘tanh’ and ‘softsign’ activation methods.
The confusion matrix of these two methods is given in Table 9.
Table 9
Confusion matrix for Layer Mode 2 with test dataset
P N
P 292 0
N 0 722
tanh
P N
P 304 0
N 0 710
softsign
When we run our model with the binary data class, we obtained a 100% accuracy
rate after nearly 50 epochs. We obtained this accuracy rate with the DNN model
created with the following parameter sequence:
• DNN Optimizer Algorithm : SGD,
• Nodes in the layers : 129(Input)-400-650-400-150-2(Output),
• Dropout Rate : 20%,
• Kernel Initializer : Uniform,
• Activation Method : Softsign,
• Epochs : 300,
• Output Activation Method : sigmoid,
• Output Loss Method : binary crossentropy.
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With these parameters, the training duration of our model is 11:00 for 4055 differ-
ent processes. The test duration is approximately 514 milliseconds for 1014 different
processes, and the detection time of the new incoming attack is 0.5 milliseconds.
The Layer Mode 3 design results of the binary data class are given in detail in
Table 10.
Table 10
Binary data class results for Layer Mode 3
Epochs Accuracy Precision Recall F Score
relu 500 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999
softsign 500 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999
linear 500 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999
An analysis of the data in the Layer Mode 3 design shows that the three most suc-
cessful results are obtained with the ‘relu’, ‘softsign’, and ‘linear’ activation methods.
The confusion matrix of these three methods is given in Table 11.
Table 11
Confusion matrix for Layer Mode 3 with test dataset
P N
P 295 1
N 0 718
relu
P N
P 312 1
N 0 701
softsign
P N
P 297 0
N 1 716
linear
When we run our model with the binary data class, we obtained a 99.9% accuracy
rate after nearly 80 epochs. We obtained this accuracy rate with the DNN model
created with the following parameter sequence:
• DNN Optimizer Algorithm : SGD,
• Nodes in the layers : 129(Input)-400-650-900-650-400-150-2(Output),
• Dropout Rate : 20%,
• Kernel Initializer : Uniform,
• Activation Method : Softsign,
• Epochs : 500,
• Output Activation Method : sigmoid,
• Output Loss Method : binary crossentropy.
With these parameters, the training duration of our model is 40:00 for 4055
different processes. The test duration is approximately 1 second for 1014 different
processes, and the detection time of the new incoming attack is 0.98 milliseconds.
3.4.3. Triple data class results
The model is run separately for 15 datasets in triple data class with triple tags with
−1 Natural, 0-Normal, 1-Attack. The Layer Mode 1 design results of the triple data
class are given in detail in Table 12.
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Table 12
Triple data class results for Layer Mode 1
Epochs Accuracy Precision Recall F Score
tanh 200 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
softsign 200 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
An analysis of the data in the Layer Mode 1 design shows that the two most
successful results are obtained with the ‘tanh’ and ‘softsign’ activation methods.
The confusion matrix of these two methods is given in Table 13.
Table 13
Confusion matrix for Layer Mode 1 with test dataset
−1 0 1
−1 221 0 0
0 0 70 0
1 0 0 723
tanh
−1 0 1
−1 241 0 0
0 0 67 0
1 0 0 706
softsign
When we run our model with the triple data class, we obtained a 100% accuracy
rate after nearly 60 epochs. We obtained this accuracy rate with the DNN model
created with the following parameter sequence:
• DNN Optimizer Algorithm : SGD,
• Nodes in the layers : 129(Input)-400-150-3(Output),
• Dropout Rate : 20%,
• Kernel Initializer : Uniform,
• Activation Method : Softsign,
• Epochs : 200,
• Output Activation Method : softmax,
• Output Loss Method : categorical crossentropy.
With these parameters, the training duration of our model is 1:53 for 4055 differ-
ent processes. The test duration is approximately 241 milliseconds for 1014 different
processes, and the detection time of the new incoming attack is 0.23 milliseconds.
The Layer Mode 2 design results of the triple data class are given in detail in
Table 14.
Table 14
Triple data class results for Layer Mode 2
Epochs Accuracy Precision Recall F Score
tanh 300 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999
softsign 300 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999
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An analysis of the data in the Layer Mode 2 design shows that the two most
successful results are obtained with the ‘tanh’ and ‘softsign’ activation methods.
The confusion matrix of these two methods is given in Table 15.
Table 15
Confusion matrix for Layer Mode 2 with test dataset
–1 0 1
–1 257 0 1
0 0 54 0
1 0 0 702
tanh
–1 0 1
–1 237 0 0
0 0 68 0
1 1 0 708
softsign
When we run our model with the triple data class, we obtained a 99.9% accuracy
rate after nearly 100 epochs. We obtained this accuracy rate with the DNN model
created with the following parameter sequence:
• DNN Optimizer Algorithm : SGD,
• Nodes in the layers : 129(Input)-400-650-400-150-3(Output),
• Dropout Rate : 20%,
• Kernel Initializer : Uniform,
• Activation Method : Softsign,
• Epochs : 300,
• Output Activation Method : softmax,
• Output Loss Method : categorical crossentropy.
With these parameters, the training duration of our model is 9:46 for 4055 differ-
ent processes. The test duration is approximately 751 milliseconds for 1014 different
processes, and the detection time of the new incoming attack is 0.74 milliseconds.
The Layer Mode 3 design results of the triple data class are given in detail in
Table 16.
Table 16
Triple data class results for Layer Mode 3
Epochs Accuracy Precision Recall F Score
tanh 500 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999
softsign 500 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999
An analysis of the data in the Layer Mode 3 design shows that the two most
successful results are obtained with the ‘tanh’ and ‘softsign’ activation methods.
The confusion matrix of these two methods is given in Table 17.
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Table 17
Confusion matrix for Layer Mode 3 with test dataset
−1 0 1
−1 233 0 0
0 0 66 0
1 0 1 714
tanh
−1 0 1
−1 258 1 0
0 0 55 0
1 0 0 700
softsign
When we run our model with the triple data class, we obtained a 99.9% accuracy
rate after nearly 120 epochs. We obtained this accuracy rate with the DNN model
created with the following parameter sequence:
• DNN Optimizer Algorithm : SGD,
• Nodes in the layers : 129(Input)-400-650-900-650-400-150-3(Output),
• Dropout Rate : 20%,
• Kernel Initializer : Uniform,
• Activation Method : Softsign,
• Epochs : 500,
• Output Activation Method : softmax,
• Output Loss Method : categorical crossentropy.
With these parameters, the training duration of our model is 41:00 for 4055
different processes. The test duration is approximately 1 second for 1014 different
processes, and the detection time of the new incoming attack is 1 millisecond.
3.4.4. Multi data class results
The model is run separately for 15 datasets in the multi data class with multi tags with
−2 Natural(Fault From Line), −1 Natural(Line maintenance), 0-Normal, 1-Attack
(Data Injection), 2-Attack (Command Injection), 3-Attack (Command Injection), 4-
Attack (Disabling relay function), 5-Attack (Disabling relay function), and 6-Attack
(Disabling relay function).
The Layer Mode 1 design results of the multi data class are given in detail in
Table 18.
Table 18
Multi data class results for Layer Mode 1
Epochs Accuracy Precision Recall F Score
tanh 200 0.991 0.991 0.991 0.991
softsign 200 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.998
An analysis of the data in the Layer Mode 1 design shows that the two most
successful results are obtained with the ‘tanh’ and ‘softsign’ activation methods.
The confusion matrix of these two methods is given in Table 19.
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Table 19
Confusion matrix for Layer Mode 1 with test dataset
−2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
−2 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
−1 0 179 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 61 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 134 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 81 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 43 1 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 1 231 6 0
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 163 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 63
tanh
−2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
−2 72 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
−1 0 183 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 63 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 122 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 82 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 50 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 219 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 135 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 86
softsign
When we run our model with the multi data class, we obtained a 99.8% accuracy
rate after nearly 160 epochs. We obtained this accuracy rate with the DNN model
created with the following parameter sequence:
• DNN Optimizer Algorithm : SGD,
• Nodes in the layers : 129(Input)-400-150-9(Output),
• Dropout Rate : 20%,
• Kernel Initializer : Uniform,
• Activation Method : Softsign,
• Epochs : 200,
• Output Activation Method : softmax,
• Output Loss Method : categorical crossentropy.
With these parameters, the training duration of our model is 2:04 for 4055 differ-
ent processes. The test duration is approximately 332 milliseconds for 1014 different
processes, and the detection time of the new incoming attack is 0.32 milliseconds.
The Layer Mode 2 design results of the multi data class are given in detail in
Table 20.
Table 20
Multi data class results for Layer Mode 2
Epochs Accuracy Precision Recall F Score
tanh 300 0.989 0.989 0.989 0.989
softsign 300 0.995 0.995 0.995 0.995
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An analysis of the data in the Layer Mode 2 design shows that the two most
successful results are obtained with the ‘tanh’ and ‘softsign’ activation methods.
The confusion matrix of these two methods is given in Table 21.
Table 21
Confusion matrix for Layer Mode 2 with test dataset
−2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
−2 77 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
−1 1 171 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 63 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 131 1 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 70 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 42 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 1 242 3 0
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 156 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 51
tanh
−2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
−2 85 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
−1 0 187 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 65 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 111 1 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 69 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 40 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 224 2 0
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 156 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 72
softsign
When we run our model with the multi data class, we obtained a 99.5% accuracy
rate after nearly 200 epochs. We obtained this accuracy rate with the DNN model
created with the following parameter sequence:
• DNN Optimizer Algorithm : SGD,
• Nodes in the layers : 129(Input)-400-650-400-150-9(Output),
• Dropout Rate : 20%,
• Kernel Initializer : Uniform,
• Activation Method : Softsign,
• Epochs : 300,
• Output Activation Method : softmax,
• Output Loss Method : categorical crossentropy.
With these parameters, the training duration of our model is 10:25 for 4055 differ-
ent processes. The test duration is approximately 912 milliseconds for 1014 different
processes, and the detection time of the new incoming attack is 0.9 milliseconds.
The Layer Mode 3 design results of the multi data class are given in detail in
Table 22.
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Table 22
Multi data class results for Layer Mode 3
Epochs Accuracy Precision Recall F Score
tanh 500 0.994 0.994 0.994 0.994
softsign 500 0.993 0.993 0.993 0.993
An analysis of the data in the Layer Mode 3 design shows that the two most
successful results are obtained with the ‘tanh’ and ‘softsign’ activation methods.
The confusion matrix of these two methods is given in Table 23.
Table 23
Confusion matrix for Layer Mode 3 with test dataset
−2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
−2 58 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
−1 0 194 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 73 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 125 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 66 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 36 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 233 1 0
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 142 2
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 81
tanh
−2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
−2 72 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
−1 0 170 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 66 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 97 0 1 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 1 82 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 51 1 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 1 233 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 135 1
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 101
softsign
When we run our model with the multi data class, we obtained a 99.4% accuracy
rate after nearly 300 epochs. We obtained this accuracy rate with the DNN model
created with the following parameter sequence:
• DNN Optimizer Algorithm : SGD,
• Nodes in the layers : 129(Input)-400-650-900-650-400-150-9(Output),
• Dropout Rate : 20%,
• Kernel Initializer : Uniform,
• Activation Method : Tanh,
• Epochs : 500,
• Output Activation Method : softmax,
• Output Loss Method : categorical crossentropy.
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With these parameters, the training duration of our model is 43:40 for 4055
different processes. The test duration is approximately 1.1 seconds for 1014 different
processes, and the detection time of the new incoming attack is 1 millisecond.
3.5. AutoEncoder results
For the best results of the AutoEncoder model, the activation methods were designed
and run as sequence parameters as in the Deep Neural Network model.
The results were analyzed, and the best result with the DNN model was obtained
by using the linear activation method; the linear activation method was used in the
encode and decode layers of the AutoEncoder model.
In the model, there are three designs: Layer Mode 1, Layer Mode 2, and Layer
Mode 3.
The numbers of the layers and nodes in these designs are given in Table 24.
Table 24
Nodes in Layers with AutoEncoder
Layer mode AutoEncoder model DNN model
1 129-64-32-64-129 129-400-150-2/3/9
2 129-64-32-64-129 129-400-650-400-150-2/3/9
3 129-64-32-64-129 129-400-650-900-650-400-150-2/3/9
There are too many parameters in the operation. To provide a more meaningful
representation of the outputs of the study, the results of the data classes called binary,
triple, multi are presented separately below.
3.5.1. Binary data class results with AutoEncoder model
The model is run separately for 15 datasets in the binary data class with binary tags
with 0-Normal and 1-Attack.
The Layer Mode 1 design results of the binary data class are given in detail in
Table 25.
Table 25
Binary data class results for Layer Mode 1
Epochs Accuracy Precision Recall F Score
tanh 200 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
softplus 200 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999
softsign 200 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999
An analysis of the data in the Layer Mode 1 design shows that the three most
successful results are obtained with the ‘tanh’, ‘softplus’, and ‘softsign’ activation
methods.
Sensor-based cyberattack detection in critical infrastructures . . . 231
The confusion matrix of these three methods is given in Table 26.
Table 26
Confusion matrix for Layer Mode 1 with test dataset
P N
P 303 0
N 0 711
tanh
P N
P 307 1
N 0 706
softplus
P N
P 302 0
N 1 711
softsign
When we run our model with the binary data class, we obtained a 100% accuracy
rate after nearly 75 epochs. We obtained this accuracy rate with the DNN model
created with the following parameter sequence:
• AE Optimizer Algorithm : Adam,
• AE Nodes in the layers : 129(Input)-64-32-64-129(Output),
• DNN Optimizer Algorithm : SGD,
• DNN, Nodes in the layers : 129(Input)-400-150-2(Output),
• Dropout Rate : 20%,
• Kernel Initializer : Uniform,
• Activation Method : Tanh,
• Epochs : 200,
• Output Activation Method : sigmoid,
• Output Loss Method : binary crossentropy.
With these parameters, the training duration of our model is 4:00 for 4055 differ-
ent processes. The test duration is approximately 341 milliseconds for 1014 different
processes, and the detection time of the new incoming attack is 0.33 milliseconds.
The Layer Mode 2 design results of the binary data class are given in detail in
Table 27.
Table 27
Binary data class results for Layer Mode 2
Epochs Accuracy Precision Recall F Score
tanh 300 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
softsign 300 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999
linear 300 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999
An analysis of the data in the Layer Mode 2 design shows that the three most suc-
cessful results are obtained with the ‘tanh’, ‘softsign’, and ‘linear’ activation methods.
The confusion matrix of these three methods is given in Table 28.
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Table 28
Confusion matrix for Layer Mode 2 with test dataset
P N
P 303 0
N 0 711
tanh
P N
P 322 1
N 0 691
softsign
P N
P 308 1
N 0 705
linear
When we run our model with the binary data class, we obtained a 100% accuracy
rate after nearly 75 epochs. We obtained this accuracy rate with the DNN model
created with the following parameter sequence:
• AE Optimizer Algorithm : Adam,
• AE Nodes in the layers : 129(Input)-64-32-64-129(Output),
• DNN Optimizer Algorithm : SGD,
• DNN, Nodes in the layers : 129(Input)-400-650-400-150-2(Output),
• Dropout Rate : 20%,
• Kernel Initializer : Uniform,
• Activation Method : Tanh,
• Epochs : 300,
• Output Activation Method : sigmoid,
• Output Loss Method : binary crossentropy.
With these parameters, the training duration of our model is 11:24 for 4055 differ-
ent processes. The test duration is approximately 844 milliseconds for 1014 different
processes, and the detection time of the new incoming attack is 0.83 milliseconds.
The Layer Mode 3 design results of the binary data class are given in detail in
Table 29.
Table 29
Binary data class results for Layer Mode 3
Epochs Accuracy Precision Recall F Score
tanh 500 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
relu 500 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.998
softsign 500 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.998
An analysis of the data in the Layer Mode 3 design shows that the three most suc-
cessful results are obtained with the ‘tanh’, ‘relu’, and ‘softsign’ activation methods.
The confusion matrix of these three methods is given in Table 30.
Table 30
Confusion matrix for Layer Mode 3 with test dataset
P N
P 316 0
N 0 698
tanh
P N
P 299 2
N 0 713
relu
P N
P 338 2
N 0 674
softsign
When we run our model with the binary data class, we obtained a 100% accuracy
rate after nearly 120 epochs.
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We obtained this accuracy rate with the DNN model created with the following
parameter sequence:
• AE Optimizer Algorithm : Adam,
• AE Nodes in the layers : 129(Input)-64-32-64-129(Output),
• DNN Optimizer Algorithm : SGD,
• DNN, Nodes in the layers : 129(Input)-400-650-900-650-400-150-2(Output),
• Dropout Rate : 20%,
• Kernel Initializer : Uniform,
• Activation Method : Tanh,
• Epochs : 500,
• Output Activation Method : sigmoid,
• Output Loss Method : binary crossentropy.
With these parameters, the training duration of our model is 45:14 for 4055
different processes. The test duration is approximately 1.5 seconds for 1014 different
processes, and the detection time of the new incoming attack is 1.4 milliseconds. The
accuracy and loss graphs of the model are shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3. Binary classifier model accuracy and loss history
3.5.2. Triple data class results with AutoEncoder model
The model is run separately for 15 datasets in the triple data class with triple tags
with −1 Natural, 0-Normal, and 1-Attack. The Layer Mode 1 design results of the
triple data class are given in detail in Table 31.
Table 31
Triple data class results for Layer Mode 1
Epochs Accuracy Precision Recall F Score
tanh 200 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999
softsign 200 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999
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An analysis of the data in the Layer Mode 1 design shows that the two most
successful results are obtained with the ‘tanh’ and ‘softsign’ activation methods.
The confusion matrix of these two methods is given in Table 32.
Table 32
Confusion matrix for Layer Mode 1 with test dataset
−1 0 1
−1 250 0 0
0 0 53 0
1 1 0 710
tanh
−1 0 1
−1 233 0 0
0 0 69 0
1 0 1 711
softsign
When we run our model with the triple data class, we obtained a 99.9% accuracy
rate after nearly 150 epochs.
We obtained this accuracy rate with the DNN model created with the following
parameter sequence:
• AE Optimizer Algorithm : Adam,
• DNN Optimizer Algorithm : SGD,
• Nodes in the layers : 129(Input)-400-150-3(Output),
• Dropout Rate : 20%,
• Kernel Initializer : Uniform,
• Activation Method : Tanh,
• Epochs : 200,
• Output Activation Method : softmax,
• Output Loss Method : categorical crossentropy.
With these parameters, the training duration of our model is 2:52 for 4055 differ-
ent processes. The test duration is approximately 413 milliseconds for 1014 different
processes, and the detection time of the new incoming attack is 0.4 milliseconds.
The Layer Mode 2 design results of the triple data class are given in detail in
Table 33.
Table 33
Triple data class results for Layer Mode 2
Epochs Accuracy Precision Recall F Score
relu 300 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999
softsign 300 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.997
An analysis of the data in the Layer Mode 2 design shows that the two most
successful results are obtained with the ‘relu’ and ‘softsign’ activation methods.
The confusion matrix of these two methods is given in Table 34.
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Table 34
Confusion matrix for Layer Mode 2 with test dataset
-1 0 1
-1 244 0 1
0 0 71 0
1 0 0 698
relu
-1 0 1
-1 241 1 0
0 0 73 0
1 1 1 697
softsign
When we run our model with the triple data class, we obtained a 99.7% accuracy
rate after nearly 150 epochs.
We obtained this accuracy rate with the DNN model created with the following
parameter sequence:
• AE Optimizer Algorithm : Adam,
• DNN Optimizer Algorithm : SGD,
• Nodes in the layers : 129(Input)-400-650-400-150-3(Output),
• Dropout Rate : 20%,
• Kernel Initializer : Uniform,
• Activation Method : Softsign,
• Epochs : 300,
• Output Activation Method : softmax,
• Output Loss Method : categorical crossentropy.
With these parameters, the training duration of our model is 14:33 for 4055 differ-
ent processes. The test duration is approximately 745 milliseconds for 1014 different
processes, and the detection time of the new incoming attack is 0.73 milliseconds.
The Layer Mode 3 design results of the triple data class are given in detail in
Table 35.
Table 35
Triple data class results for Layer Mode 3
Epochs Accuracy Precision Recall F Score
relu 500 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.998
softsign 500 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.998
linear 500 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
An analysis of the data in the Layer Mode 3 design shows that the three most suc-
cessful results are obtained with the ‘relu’, ‘softsign’, and ‘linear’ activation methods.
The confusion matrix of these three methods is given in Table 36.
Table 36
Confusion matrix for Layer Mode 3 with test dataset
−1 0 1
−1 229 0 1
0 0 65 0
1 1 0 718
relu
−1 0 1
−1 233 0 1
0 0 58 0
1 1 0 721
softsign
−1 0 1
−1 250 0 0
0 0 53 0
1 0 0 711
linear
236 Murat Yilmaz, Ferhat Ozgur Catak, Ensar Gul
When we run our model with the triple data class, we obtained a 100% accuracy
rate after nearly 80 epochs. We obtained this accuracy rate with the DNN model
created with the following parameter sequence:
• AE Optimizer Algorithm : Adam,
• DNN Optimizer Algorithm : SGD,
• Nodes in the layers : 129(Input)-400-650-900-650-400-150-3(Output),
• Dropout Rate : 20%,
• Kernel Initializer : Uniform,
• Activation Method : Linear,
• Epochs : 500,
• Output Activation Method : softmax,
• Output Loss Method : categorical crossentropy.
With these parameters, the training duration of our model is 49:43 for 4055
different processes. The test duration is approximately 1.7 seconds for 1014 different
processes, and the detection time of the new incoming attack is 1.6 milliseconds. The
accuracy and loss graphs of the model are shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4. Triple classifier model accuracy and loss history
3.5.3. Multi data class results with AutoEncoder model
The model is run separately for 15 datasets in the multi data class with multi tags with
−2 Natural (Fault From Line), −1 Natural (Line maintenance), 0-Normal, 1-Attack
(Data Injection), 2-Attack (Command Injection), 3-Attack (Command Injection),
4-Attack (Disabling relay function), 5-Attack (Disabling relay function), and 6-Attack
(Disabling relay function). The Layer Mode 1 design results of the multi data class
are given in detail in Table 37.
Table 37
Multi data class results for Layer Mode 1
Epochs Accuracy Precision Recall F Score
tanh 200 0.975 0.975 0.975 0.975
softsign 200 0.983 0.983 0.983 0.983
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An analysis of the data in the Layer Mode 1 design shows that the two most
successful results are obtained with the ‘tanh’ and ‘softsign’ activation methods.
The confusion matrix of these two methods is given in Table 38.
Table 38
Confusion matrix for Layer Mode 1 with test dataset
−2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
−2 53 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
−1 3 161 1 2 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 81 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 121 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 1 76 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 1 5 41 1 0 0
4 0 0 0 1 0 1 230 2 0
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 153 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 73
tanh
−2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
−2 79 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
−1 2 176 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 52 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 112 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 1 73 1 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 4 36 2 0 0
4 0 0 0 1 0 0 252 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 141 1
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 76
softsign
When we run our model with the multi data class, we obtained a 98.3% accuracy
rate after nearly 200 epochs. We obtained this accuracy rate with the DNN model
created with the following parameter sequence:
• AE Optimizer Algorithm : Adam,
• DNN Optimizer Algorithm : SGD,
• Nodes in the layers : 129(Input)-400-150-9(Output),
• Dropout Rate : 20%,
• Kernel Initializer : Uniform,
• Activation Method : Softsign,
• Epochs : 200,
• Output Activation Method : softmax,
• Output Loss Method : categorical crossentropy.
With these parameters, the training duration of our model is 4:35 for 4055 differ-
ent processes. The test duration is approximately 576 milliseconds for 1014 different
processes, and the detection time of the new incoming attack is 0.56 milliseconds.
The Layer Mode 2 design results of the multi data class are given in detail in
Table 39.
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Table 39
Multi data class results for Layer Mode 2
Epochs Accuracy Precision Recall F Score
tanh 300 0.987 0.987 0.987 0.987
softsign 300 0.977 0.977 0.977 0.977
An analysis of the data in the Layer Mode 2 design shows that the two most
successful results are obtained with the ‘tanh’ and ‘softsign’ activation methods.
The confusion matrix of these two methods is given in Table 40.
Table 40
Confusion matrix for Layer Mode 2 with test dataset
−2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
−2 63 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
−1 1 184 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 52 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 3 0 113 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 77 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 45 2 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 236 2 0
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 150 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 81
tanh
−2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
−2 78 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
−1 1 173 1 2 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 67 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 103 3 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 1 66 2 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 2 32 1 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 1 229 1 0
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 169 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 74
softsign
When we run our model with the multi data class, we obtained a 98.7% accuracy
rate after nearly 300 epochs. We obtained this accuracy rate with the DNN model
created with the following parameter sequence:
• AE Optimizer Algorithm : Adam,
• DNN Optimizer Algorithm : SGD,
• Nodes in the layers : 129(Input)-400-650-400-150-9(Output),
• Dropout Rate : 20%,
• Kernel Initializer : Uniform,
• Activation Method : Tanh,
• Epochs : 300,
• Output Activation Method : softmax,
• Output Loss Method : categorical crossentropy.
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With these parameters, the training duration of our model is 17:54 for 4055 differ-
ent processes. The test duration is approximately 894 milliseconds for 1014 different
processes, and the detection time of the new incoming attack is 0.88 milliseconds.
The Layer Mode 3 design results of the multi data class are given in detail in
Table 41.
Table 41
Multi data class results for Layer Mode 3
Epochs Accuracy Precision Recall F Score
tanh 500 0.981 0.981 0.981 0.981
softsign 500 0.990 0.990 0.990 0.990
An analysis of the data in the Layer Mode 3 design shows that the two most
successful results are obtained with the ‘tanh’ and ‘softsign’ activation methods.
The confusion matrix of these two methods is given in Table 42.
Table 42
Confusion matrix for Layer Mode 3 with test dataset
−2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
−2 60 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
−1 2 185 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 69 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 111 1 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 86 1 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 1 0 41 3 0 0
4 0 0 0 1 1 1 218 4 0
5 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 148 2
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 77
tanh
−2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
−2 60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
−1 0 203 2 2 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 73 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 114 1 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 1 69 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 33 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 239 1 0
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 145 1
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 68
softsign
When we run our model with the multi data class, we obtained a 99% accuracy
rate after nearly 500 epochs.
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We obtained this accuracy rate with the DNN model created with the following
parameter sequence:
• AE Optimizer Algorithm : Adam,
• DNN Optimizer Algorithm : SGD,
• Nodes in the layers : 129(Input)-400-650-900-650-400-150-9(Output),
• Dropout Rate : 20%,
• Kernel Initializer : Uniform,
• Activation Method : Softsign,
• Epochs : 500,
• Output Activation Method : softmax,
• Output Loss Method : categorical crossentropy.
With these parameters, the training duration of our model is 44:00 for 4055
different processes. The test duration is approximately 1.8 seconds for 1014 different
processes, and the detection time of the new incoming attack is 1.8 milliseconds.
The accuracy and loss graphs of the model are shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5. Multi classifier model accuracy and loss history
3.6. Classification model results
We used three different algorithms in the classification models: Support Vector Ma-
chine (SVM), K-Nearest Neighbors (KNN), and Decision Trees (DTs). We used four
different kernel types in the SVM algorithm; rbf, linear, poly, sigmoid.
3.6.1. Binary data class results with classification models
The models are run in the binary data class with binary tags with 0-Normal and
1-Attack. The results of the three algorithms used in the classification models are
given in detail in Table 43.
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Table 43
Binary data class results with classification models
SVM SVM SVM SVM KNN DTs
Kernel types rbf linear poly sigmoid – –
Accuracy 0.9941 0.9901 0.9951 0.9941 0.9596 1.0
Precision 0.9941 0.9903 0.9951 0.9941 0.9598 1.0
Recall 0.9941 0.9901 0.9951 0.9941 0.9596 1.0
F Score 0.9941 0.9901 0.9951 0.9941 0.9591 1.0
Process time (minute) 2:00 2:00 2:00 2:00 4:00 00:08
3.6.2. Multi data class results with classification models
The models are run in the multi data class with multitags with −2 Natural (Fault
From Line), −1 Natural (Line maintenance), 0-Normal, 1-Attack (Data Injection),
2-Attack (Command Injection), 3-Attack (Command Injection), 4-Attack (Disabling
relay function), 5-Attack (Disabling relay function), and 6-Attack (Disabling relay
function). The results of the three algorithms used in the classification models are
given in detail in Table 44.
Table 44
Multi data class results with classification models
SVM SVM SVM SVM KNN DTs
Kernel types rbf linear poly sigmoid – –
Accuracy 0.6815 0.6588 0.6755 0.6805 0.5996 1.0
Precision 0.7074 0.6813 0.6974 0.6981 0.5972 1.0
Recall 0.6815 0.6588 0.6755 0.6805 0.5996 1.0
F Score 0.6445 0.6338 0.6489 0.6519 0.5947 1.0
Process time (minute) 14:00 14:00 14:00 14:00 4:00 00:30
4. Conclusion
Industrial systems that perform crucial work to raise people’s living standards are
partially isolated environments; however, like any electronic system, they are vulner-
able to cyberattacks. Research shows that attacks on these systems are increasing day
by day. With the increase of cyberattacks, the methods of attack have also begun to
differentiate. So, it has become increasingly difficult to detect these cyberattacks in
a short time. The detection speed of the cyberattacks on industrial systems (including
critical infrastructures) must be very high. In this study, a model was developed to
quickly detect cyberattacks on industrial systems. The proposed model is based on
deep learning methods. The reason for choosing deep learning methods in this study
is the high maturity levels of the algorithms and technologies used. Hence, these
technologies have a high level of robustness; they are also used in many commercial
products. In this study, we used a new published dataset created by Mississippi State
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University and Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Our proposed model’s classification
performance is better than the Morris at al. results given in the Related Work section.
The original work results are 90.4%, 93%, and 99.1%, respectively. In our study; we
obtained 100%, 100%, and 99.8% accuracy rates with binary, triple, and multi-labeled
datasets, respectively. Our plan is to convert the proposed attack detection model
with the transfer learning method. Applying the transfer learning model with an
autoencoder algorithm, the new developed model will require less training time.
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